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ARTICLES 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
ALLOWING JURIES TO INTERPRET THE 
LAW ARE NOT AS CRAZY AS THEY SOUND 
MARCUS ALEXANDER GADSON† 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, just about everyone in the legal profession takes for 
granted that judges should interpret the law and juries should 
only determine facts.  That attitude would have surprised many 
colonists who settled in the New World as well as citizens in the 
new republic after independence.  In several colonies, juries had 
the right not just to decide factual disputes, but to interpret the 
law in criminal cases.  After the founding, many states codified 
the right of juries to resolve legal questions—a right retained for 
much of the nineteenth century. 
Slowly but surely, this right was eroded.  Today, only three 
states—Maryland, Georgia, and Indiana—have constitutional 
provisions recognizing juries’ right to interpret the law in 
criminal cases.  Maryland and Georgia courts have nullified the 
provisions, while Indiana has applied it, albeit narrowly.  A 
consensus has developed that professionally trained judges with 
legal expertise are better suited to interpret the law than lay 
jurors.  Unsurprisingly, modern lawyers, commentators, and 
judges have taken for granted that state constitutional provisions 
such as Indiana’s, Maryland’s, and Georgia’s are “outmoded 
relic[s]”1 that no longer belong in a modern justice system.  These 
provisions have been described as “ridiculous,” “absurd,” and 
“comical.”2 
 
† The author thanks the editors of the St. John’s Law Review, Michael Klarman, 
Nicole Garnett, Susannah Barton-Tobin, Carol Steiker, and Fredrik Bergman for 
their assistance on this project at various stages. 
1 Beavers v. State, 236 Ind. 549, 556 (1957). 
2 James J. Robinson, Proposals for the Improvement of the Administration of 
Criminal Justice in Indiana, 2 IND. L.J. 217, 224 n.13 (1926). 
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This Article questions that consensus.  Joining a larger 
debate about the jury’s proper role, it argues that, even today, 
these provisions are a defensible component of a criminal justice 
system.  First, this Article argues that the jury is the entity in 
the justice system most incentivized to approach legal questions 
with an eye to what the best interpretation is and not the most 
politically palatable result.  Second, this Article argues that the 
jury’s ability to deliberate and consider opinions from individuals 
hailing from a wider variety of backgrounds than those who 
typically become judges may provide advantages over a single 
trial court judge in interpreting the law.  Third, it acknowledges 
practical difficulties that allowing juries to interpret the law 
could cause, but argues that they are not so insurmountable as to 
make it unreasonable for state constitutional provisions like 
Indiana’s, Maryland’s, and Georgia’s to allow juries to interpret 
the law.  Finally, this Article contemplates ways such provisions 
could dramatically change plea bargaining. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. History in England 
America’s jury system originated in England.  So, English 
history offers valuable insights into how American juries came to 
acquire the power to resolve legal questions. 
The consensus view from England was traditionally that 
juries could only determine factual issues.3  William Blackstone 
argued that jurors were “the best investigators of truth,” but 
should not determine issues of law, since “if the power of 
judicature were placed at random in the hands of the multitude, 
their decisions would be wild and capricious, and a new rule of 
action would be every day established in our courts.”4  There was 
a minority view.  During the 1600s, the Levellers advocated 
giving the jury a greater role in the legal system and allowing it 
to interpret the law.5  To Levellers, law “was a form of divine 
command comprehensible and accessible to the common man.”6  
 
3 Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 415 (1996). 
4 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *379–80; see also Smith, supra note 
1, at 415. 
5 THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800, at 153 (1985). 
6 Id. at 165. 
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That is to say, ordinary jurors were just as capable as judges of 
interpreting the law.  In some ways, the Puritans who settled in 
the New World held similar views towards religion.  Puritans 
believed in a “priesthood of all believers” and that laymen had a 
responsibility to study the scriptures on their own rather than 
simply relying on a minister’s teaching.7 
This attitude found expression in John Lilburne’s 1649 trial 
for high treason.  Lilburne allegedly “maliciously, advisedly, and 
traiterously did plot, contrive and endeavour to stir up, and to 
raise force” against the Crown.8  As evidence against him, the 
government quoted his writings.9  Denied a lawyer, Lilburne 
asked to address the jury about matters of law.10  Lord Keble 
replied, “[T]he jury are judges of matters of fact altogether, and 
Judge Coke says so:  But I tell you the opinion of the Court, they 
are not judges of matter of law.”11  Lilburne responded, “The jury 
by law are not only judges of fact, but of law also: and you that 
call yourselves judges of the law, are no more but Norman 
intruders; and in deed and in truth, if the jury please, are no 
more but ciphers, to pronounce their verdict.”12  The jury 
acquitted Lilburne in under an hour and celebrations erupted.13  
A medal was even made to honor the jury, reading “John 
Lilburne, saved by the power of the Lord and the integrity of his 
jury, who are judge of law as well as fact.”14 
This would not be Lilburne’s last brush with the law or the 
last time he would argue that jurors were not only judges of fact.  
At a 1653 trial on a charge of violating his order of banishment, 
Lilburne argued that the parliamentary statute authorizing his 
banishment was contrary to fundamental English law, that is, it 
was unconstitutional.15  In the 1653 trial, the jury appears to 
have accepted Lilburne’s argument that it could interpret the law 
as well as determine the facts.  Although the court instructed 
jurors that they were judges of fact only, one juror said the jury 
 
7 See Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 252–53 
(1983). 
8 Green, supra note 5, at 171. 
9 Id. at 172. 
10 Id. at 173. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 175–76. 
14 Id. at 176. 
15 Id. at 192–93. 
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was convinced to acquit by what they heard out of a law book.16  
Interestingly, although the United States Supreme Court cited a 
1637 case of Lilburne’s where he argued for a fundamental right 
to not have to answer questions concerning oneself in a criminal 
case as evidence of the original understanding of the Fifth 
Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination,17 it has not 
looked to Lilburne’s treason or banishment cases to understand 
the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 
B. Juries Acquire the Power to Resolve Legal Questions in the 
New World 
In at least some colonies—especially in New England—juries 
could determine legal issues before independence.  Jurors in 
Massachusetts were permitted to ignore judges’ views of the law 
when they gave them,18 though perhaps for practical reasons as 
well as ideological ones.  At least three judges often sat at the 
same time.19  Unsurprisingly, panels of multiple judges 
sometimes had conflicting views on the law,20 which would have 
made giving coherent instructions difficult.  Jurors would then 
have to decide whose view of the law to apply.21  Regardless, 
jurors’ rights to determine legal issues evidently became so 
engrained in Massachusetts that, on the eve of the American 
Revolution, John Adams called it “an Absurdity to suppose that 
the Law would oblige jurors to find a Verdict according to the 
Direction of the Court, against their own Opinion, Judgment, and 
Conscience.”22 
New York juries also had the right to determine legal issues.  
In criminal cases, lawyers could argue the law to the jury, and 
jurors could ask questions about the law.23  A few cases are 
instructive.  In a 1702 treason case, one of the lawyers argued in 
his closing statement that jurors were judges of the law and that 
they had to resolve a legal question to decide the case.24  
 
16 Id. at 197. 
17 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–59 (1966). 
18 Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury 
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 904 (1994). 
19 Id. at 904–05. 
20 Id. at 905. 
21 See id. 
22 Id. at 906. 
23 Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine 
the Law in Colonial America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 175, 177 (1988). 
24 Id. at 179 (citing Dom. Rex v. Bayard, 14 Howell’s St. Trials 471, 504 (1702)). 
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According to the lawyer’s report on the case, neither the judge 
nor the prosecutor challenged him.25  In a 1707 case, Francis 
Makemie went on trial for preaching without a license; he had 
preached in some of New York’s dissenting churches.26  Only 
legal issues were disputed in the case.27  The questions were 
about the applicability of parliamentary acts in the New World 
and “the extent of religious liberty in New York.”28  The Attorney 
General asked for a special verdict:  “[T]he matter of fact is 
plainly confessed by the Defendant, as you have heard, . . . [and] 
you are not Judges of Law.”29  Chief Justice Mompesson 
disagreed.  He told the jury that it had the authority to decide 
legal questions and even admitted that he did not have the 
answers to the legal issues raised in the case, stating that “[t]his 
is the first Instance I can learn, has been of a Tryal or 
Prosecution of this nature in America.”30 
The best known case in New York—and likely the rest of the 
country—was the famous 1735 case of John Zenger.  Zenger was 
charged with libel for publishing an article criticizing New York’s 
governor.31  At trial, Chief Justice De Lancey excluded evidence 
that the article was true on the ground that truth was not a 
defense to libel under English law.32  Instead, he stated that the 
jury could only decide if “Zenger printed and published [the] 
papers.”33  However, Zenger’s attorney responded, “I do likewise 
know they may do otherwise.  I know they have the right beyond 
all dispute to determine both the law and the fact, and where 
they do not doubt of the law, they ought to do so.”34  At least 
according to the defense’s retelling of the trial—which no one has 
challenged—Chief Justice De Lancey relented and conceded in 
 
25 Id. at 179–80. 
26 Id. at 181. 
27 Id. at 181–82. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 182 (quoting FRANCIS MAKEMIE, A NARRATIVE OF A NEW AND UNUSUAL 
AMERICAN IMPRISONMENT, OF TWO PRESBYTERIAN MINISTERS, AND PROSECUTION OF 
MR. FRANCIS MAKEMIE ONE OF THEM, FOR PREACHING ONE SERMON AT THE CITY OF 
NEW YORK (1707) (Evans #1300) (ellipsis and alteration in original). 
30 Id. at 182–83. 
31 Id. at 183–84. 
32 Id. at 184. 
33 Id. (quoting JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL 
OF JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 78 (Stanley 
Nider Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972)) (alteration in original). 
34 Id. 
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his final instructions that the jury could decide the legal issue of 
whether truth was a defense to libel.35  It did.36 
Juries in Rhode Island had the power to interpret the law, 
too.37  A nineteenth-century commentator said that from the 
beginning of the colony, Rhode Island judges sat “not for the 
purpose of deciding causes, for the Jury decided all questions of 
law and fact; but merely to preserve order, and to see that the 
parties had a fair chance with the Jury.”38  And in 1699, 
Governor Bellomont explained to the Board of Trade that Rhode 
Island judges “give no directions to the jury, nor sum up the 
evidences to them, pointing unto the issue which they are to 
try.”39  In fact, a trial on a charge of forcible entry in 1662 
indicates that the jury was supposed to decide whether an 
indictment was valid.40 
That said, in some colonies, juries did not have the right to 
answer legal questions. In others, the historical record is too thin 
to say definitively.41 
C. After the American Revolution 
At some point after independence, it was commonly accepted 
that juries could determine legal issues.  That becomes clear from 
reviewing the records of some of the few jury trials conducted by 
the Supreme Court and the attempted removal of Justice Chase. 
In Georgia v. Brailsford, the Court considered whether 
British creditors could recover debts from the American 
Revolution.42  The Supreme Court held a jury trial because 
“whenever a State is a party, the Supreme court has exclusive 
jurisdiction of the suit; and her right cannot be effectually 
 
35 Id. at 184–85. 
36 JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF JOHN 
PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 101 (Stanley Nider 
Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972). 
37 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 
582, 591 (1939). 
38 Krauss, supra note 23, at 191 (quoting Preface to I D. Chipman (Vt. 1824)). 
39 Id. at 192 (quoting 3 RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND, AND 
PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, IN NEW ENGLAND 387 (John Russell Bartlett ed., 1858)). 
40 Id. at 193. 
41 See id. at 130–31 (finding little evidence about South Carolina juries’ law-
finding authority); id. at 131–32 (same as to Delaware juries); id. at 135–36 (finding 
ambiguous evidence concerning North Carolina juries); id. at 138–45 (same as to 
Georgia juries); id. at 146–60 (finding juries probably did not have the right to 
determine the law in Maryland); id. at 160–67 (finding insufficient evidence 
concerning New Jersey juries); id. at 169–74 (same as to Pennsylvania juries). 
42 See generally 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 402 (1792). 
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supported, by a voluntary appearance, before any other tribunal 
of the Union.”43  At trial, Justice Jay instructed the jury that “[i]t 
is presumed that juries are the best judges of the facts; it is, on 
the other hand, presumable, that the court are the best judges of 
the law” but that “[i]t must be observed, that by the same law, 
which recognizes this reasonable distribution of jurisdiction, you 
have nevertheless a right to take upon yourselves to judge of 
both, and to determine the law as well as the fact in 
controversy.”44  Justice Jay’s instruction suggests some hesitation 
about allowing juries to resolve legal questions because he 
intimated to the jury that it should follow the Court’s reading of 
the law.  It is significant that even a person with misgivings 
about giving juries a law finding right felt compelled to concede 
it. 
This view was so entrenched that denying juries their right 
to interpret the law almost led to Justice Samuel Chase’s 
removal.  One of the charges against him was that, while riding 
circuit, he had tried “to wrest from the jury their indisputable 
right to hear argument, and determine upon the question of the 
law, as well as on the question of fact, involved in the verdict 
they are required to give.”45  At issue was Justice Chase’s conduct 
in three cases.  First, in Thomas Cooper’s trial, Cooper was 
charged with violating the Sedition Act for publishing a handbill 
attacking President John Adams and accusing him of biasing the 
judiciary against Democrats.46  At trial, Justice Chase instructed 
the jury that it was to convict Cooper if any part of what Cooper 
wrote was untrue.47  Second, Justice Chase presided at John 
Fries’s trial for leading a group of men to intimidate tax 
collectors.48  Fries’s counsel complained that Justice Chase 
prevented him from introducing federal statutes into evidence 
and from arguing for a different interpretation of treason to the 
jury than Justice Chase had given.49  Finally, Justice Chase 
conducted James Callender’s trial for treason.50  Callender had 
 
43 Id. at 406. 
44 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 907 (quoting Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 1, 4 (1794)). 
45 Id. at 908. 
46 Adam A. Perlin, The Impeachment of Samuel Chase: Redefining Judicial 
Independence, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 725, 733 (2010). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 734. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 734–35. 
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written a pamphlet, The Prospect Before Us, criticizing the 
Federalist Party and advocating for Thomas Jefferson’s election 
in 1800.51  Callender’s lawyers attempted to argue to the jury 
that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional.52  Justice Chase 
responded, “The judicial power of the United States is the only 
proper and competent authority to decide whether any statute 
made by Congress (or any of the State Legislatures) is contrary 
to, or in violation of, the Federal Constitution.”53 
In response to the charges against him, Justice Chase said 
that he had only given “assistance” to juries about what the laws 
meant, which suggests he felt that he had to acknowledge juries’ 
right to judge the law to survive impeachment.54  The Senate 
acquitted him of the charges, and he remained on the bench.55  
Nonetheless, his experience is telling.  Those seeking to impeach 
Justice Chase had to find charges that would resonate with 
Congress and the American public.  By alleging that Justice 
Chase had denied juries their right to determine the law in 
criminal cases, his opponents demonstrated that Americans in 
the early republic may have taken the jury’s law finding power 
for granted.56 
In the aftermath, states clarified the jury’s role.  By 1851, at 
least fifteen states enshrined the jury’s right to interpret the law, 
either by practice, constitutional provision, judicial decision, or 
statute.57  In Massachusetts, for example, the legislature 
declared in 1808 that juries had the right to judge both law and  
 
 
 
 
51 Id. at 735. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 908–09. 
55 Perlin, supra note 46, at 780. 
56 But see id. at 772. One of Justice Chase’s defenders at his impeachment trial 
argued the following: [The jury is]  
bound by the general principle of law as declared by the court. Their duty, 
and their sole duty, consists in applying it to the particular case. In this 
sense, and in this alone, are they judges of the law as well as of the 
fact. . . . [B]ut it has never been entered into the head of any man to 
suppose that the jury in such a case has a right to declare that the statute 
itself is not a law of the land–has been repealed, has expired, or does not 
create any offence. All these are questions of law, which come within the 
exclusive province of the court. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
57 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 910. 
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fact, and a state constitutional convention in 1820 rejected a 
similar proposal because it would just “establish what was now 
the law of the land.”58 
D. Juries Lose Their Right to Determine the Law 
Justice Story openly questioned whether juries could resolve 
legal questions.  Before deciding the merits in United States v. 
Battiste, he answered the prisoner’s lawyer’s suggestion “that in 
criminal cases, and especially in capital cases, the jury are the 
judges of the law, as well as of the fact.”59  Although 
acknowledging that jurors had the power to decide the law 
because they issued general verdicts, Justice Story said, “It is the 
duty of the court to instruct the jury as to the law; and it is the 
duty of the jury to follow the law, as it is laid down by the court.  
This is the right of every citizen; and it is his only protection.”60 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sparf v. United States61 
signaled the death knell of the jury’s right to determine the law 
at the federal level.  Two individuals were charged with 
committing murder on the high seas and sentenced to death.62  
They challenged an instruction that said in part: 
You are the exclusive judges of the fact.  No matter what 
assumption may appear during the course of the trial in any 
ruling of mine, or what may appear in any one of these 
instructions, you are to take this case and consider it, and 
remember you are the tribunal to which the law has referred 
the case, and whose judgment the law wants on the case.63  
Both the majority and dissent thoroughly canvassed the 
history of allowing juries to interpret the law to support their 
positions.  The majority questioned whether Justice Jay had 
really instructed the jury in Brailsford that it did not have to 
accept the Court’s view of the law64 and cited cases where judges 
told juries to apply the law as provided by the court.65  Several of 
these cases came from state courts.66  Justice Gray’s dissent took 
 
58 Id. at 909. 
59 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No. 14,545). 
60 Id. 
61 156 U.S. 51 (1895). 
62 Id. at 52.  
63 Id. at 61. 
64 Id. at 64–65 (citing United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1334 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1851) (No. 15,815)). 
65 Id. at 66–69. 
66 Id. at 79–87. 
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the opposite lesson from history. Justice Gray argued that earlier 
authorities tended to support giving juries the right to interpret 
the law, and that they should have more weight than later ones 
because they were more likely to reflect the Constitution’s 
original meaning.67  Justice Gray read the history differently, 
believing that the original understanding should govern, even if 
judges came to believe it was unwise to allow juries to resolve 
legal questions.68  Most states came to the same conclusion as 
Sparf.69 
E. Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia 
Today, just three states—Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia— 
recognize juries’ right to interpret the law in their constitutions.70  
Georgia has given its provision the narrowest construction.  In 
Harris v. State, the Georgia Supreme Court observed: 
It is the province of the court to construe the law applicable in 
the trial of a criminal case, and of the jury to apply the law so 
construed to the facts in evidence.  While the impaneled jurors 
 
67 See id. at 169 (Gray, J., dissenting) (“But, upon the question of the true 
meaning and effect of the constitution of the United States in this respect, opinions 
expressed more than a generation after the adoption of the constitution have far less 
weight than the almost unanimous voice of earlier and nearly contemporaneous 
judicial declarations and practical usage.”). 
68 See id. 
69 Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 18, at 910; see also, e.g., People v. Anderson, 44 
Cal. 65, 70 (1872) (“In this State, it is so well settled as no longer to be open to 
debate, that it is the duty of the jury in a criminal case to take the law from the 
Court.”); Pierce v. State, 13 N.H. 536, 554 (1843) (“And it is the opinion of the court, 
that it is inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution that questions of law, and 
still less, questions of constitutional law, should be decided by the verdict of the jury, 
contrary to the instructions of the court.”); State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1, 34 (1892) (“We 
are thus led to the conclusion that the doctrine that jurors are the judges of the law 
in criminal cases is untenable; that it is contrary to the fundamental maxims of the 
common law from which it is claimed to take its origin . . . .”). 
70  GA. CONST. art. 1, § 1, ¶ XI (West, Westlaw through 2018 regular and special 
legislative sessions) (“In criminal cases, . . . the jury shall be the judges of the law 
and the facts.”); IND. CONST. art. 1, § 19 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second 
Regular and First Special Session of the 120th Special Assembly) (“In all criminal 
cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.”); 
MD. CONST. art. 23 (West, Westlaw through 2018 Regular Session of the General 
Assembly) (“In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as 
well as of fact, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain a conviction.”). 
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are made absolutely and exclusively judges of the facts in the 
case, they are, in this sense only, judges of the law.71 
In so doing, it harkened back to a line of defense used at Justice 
Chase’s removal trial—namely, that juries could only judge the 
law in the sense that they applied the law to the facts in a given 
case.  The Georgia Court of Appeals confirmed this view as 
recently as 2002.72  The Georgia Supreme Court has even gone so 
far as to hold that lawyers cannot read provisions of the law to 
juries if the trial court has not utilized them in its instructions, 
even if the lawyer accurately quoted the law.73 
Maryland courts have not been far behind.  In In re Petition 
for Writ of Prohibition, the state asked for a writ of mandamus to 
vacate a trial court’s grant of a motion for a new trial.74  The 
issue that arose was whether a trial court weighing the evidence 
itself violated Article 23 of the Maryland Constitution.  In 
holding that it did not, Maryland’s Court of Appeals declared 
that “the jury’s right to judge the law is virtually eliminated; the 
provision, as we have construed it, basically protects the jury’s 
right to judge the facts.”75  There was ample support for that view 
in Maryland’s caselaw.  In Lewis v. State, for example, a 
defendant argued that the trial court erred in telling the jury 
that its instructions about the law surrounding the admissibility 
of confessions were advisory only.76  Though the court did not set 
aside the conviction, it did observe that the “determinations of 
the law governing the admissibility of evidence are within the 
sole domain of the trial judge.”77  As far back as in 1858, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals held that a jury could not decide 
whether a statute was constitutional.78  Additionally, in one case, 
Maryland’s intermediate appellate court held that Article 23 of 
the Maryland Constitution entitled a jury to decide whether 
entrapment occurred as a matter of law,79 a decision that was 
 
71 Harris v. State, 190 Ga. 258, 263 (1940) (emphasis added) (acknowledging 
that Georgia courts had retreated from prior decisions allowing jurors to interpret 
the law differently from judges). 
72 Whitehead v. State, 258 Ga. App. 271, 276–77 (2002). 
73 See Conklin v. State, 254 Ga. 558, 569–71 (1985). 
74 312 Md. 280, 285 (1988). 
75 Id. at 318. 
76 285 Md. 705, 724 (1979). 
77 Id. (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1963)). 
78 Franklin v. State, 12 Md. 236, 246 (1858). 
79 Byrd v. State, 16 Md. App. 391, 403 (1972) (“It was not, under the 
circumstances of this case, for the trial judge to decide as a matter of law that there 
was no entrapment.”). 
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later overruled.80  Finally, the Maryland Court of Appeals held in 
2012 that telling jurors that a court’s instructions on the law 
were advisory—which comports with Article 23 of the state’s 
constitution—violated a defendant’s federal due process rights.81 
Appellate courts in Indiana have sometimes enforced the 
state’s constitutional provision, though, even as the rest of the 
country stripped from juries the right to interpret the law.  In 
Steinbarger v. State, the defendant was on trial for burglary.82  
The trial court instructed the jury that “[i]f any person previously 
convicted of a felony be found having in his possession any 
burglar tools or implements with intent to commit the crime of 
burglary, such person shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”83  The 
Indiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction after observing 
that “the jury is the sole judge of both the law and the facts in the 
case.  The courts may not usurp or infringe this fundamental 
right.  The right may not be modified or minimized by 
instructions or otherwise.”84  Giving the instruction was therefore 
inappropriate.85 
The Indiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the provision’s 
vitality—at least to some degree—in Seay v. State.86  Seay sought 
collateral relief for his conviction of being a habitual offender, 
which followed a dealing-in-drugs conviction.87  In the habitual 
offender proceeding, the trial court instructed the jury to judge 
only the facts and not the law.88  Seay argued that he was 
entitled to have a jury decide whether he was a “habitual 
offender” as a matter of law—not just decide whether he had 
prior convictions under Indiana’s habitual offender statute.89  
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed, writing that “[t]he jury was 
judge of both the law and facts as to that issue and it was error to 
instruct the jury otherwise.”90 
 
80 Sparks v. State, 91 Md. App. 35, 71 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (“It is our 
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However, Indiana courts have generally construed the 
provision narrowly.  The Indiana Supreme Court has held that 
the Indiana Consitution, Article 1 § 19, neither applies in the 
sentencing context91 nor allows a jury to decide whether a statute 
is constitutional.92  Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court has 
also suggested that appellate decisions are binding on jurors.93  
In Beavers, the Indiana Supreme Court openly questioned the 
provision’s wisdom.94  To this day, though, Indiana’s pattern jury 
instruction says, “[u]nder the Constitution of Indiana you have 
the right to determine both the law and the facts.  The 
Court’s/my instructions are your best source in determining the 
law.”95 
II. ANALYSIS 
Over the last century, a consensus has developed that state 
constitutional provisions such as Maryland’s, Indiana’s, and 
Georgia’s are profoundly unwise and have no application in a 
modern justice system.96  The president of the Indiana Bar 
Association described Article 1 § 19, of the Indiana Constitution 
as “ridiculous,” “absurd,” and “comical.”97  In this section, I argue 
that such provisions are actually a rational component of a 
modern justice system.  I arrive at this conclusion because juries 
have the least incentive to make political calculations when they 
interpret the law of any entity in state justice systems as 
currently constituted.  Additionally, their incentives and 
structure allow them to check judges and other branches of 
government.  Furthermore, the fact that they are cumulative 
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bodies comprised of individuals—usually, twelve—from a broader 
range of backgrounds than judges typically come from gives them 
advantages over a single trial judge in interpreting the law.  
Finally, several practical concerns that jurists and commentators 
have raised about allowing juries to interpret the law are not 
insurmountable. 
A. The Role of Incentives 
Most of us respond to incentives.  Research has suggested 
that incentives in play affect how doctors treat patients.98  In the 
legal profession, there has long been a recognition that attorneys 
respond to incentives.  For example, with compensation tied to 
the billable hour, one author has suggested “there was no 
incentive whatsoever to settle cases early” in legal malpractice 
claims.99  This suggests lawyers may behave in ways that 
increase their bottom line even when the decisions to do so are 
not in their clients’ best interests.  In criminal cases, the judges 
and attorneys both have incentives that may not always be in 
line with interpreting the law correctly, or in the best way for 
society. 
1.  Judges’ Incentives 
A motive to keep one’s current employment or move up to a 
higher level affects the decisions we make.  How we choose 
judges or elevate them impacts how they decide cases.  States 
generally use four methods to pick judges.  The first is a direct 
partisan election where each party puts forth nominees from 
whom voters choose in a general election.100  The second is a 
direct nonpartisan election where voters select from candidates 
who have not formally affiliated with a political party.101  The 
third is some variation of the Missouri Plan.  In these states, a 
commission presents a list of candidates to the governor from 
which she must choose.  Judges appointed by the governor are 
 
98 Alan Meisel, Managed Care, Autonomy, and Decisionmaking at the End of 
Life, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 1393, 1409 (1999) (observing that the “fee-for-service system, 
therefore, creates an incentive for doctors to provide unnecessary treatment even 
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99 Manuel R. Ramos, Legal and Law School Malpractice: Confessions of a 
Lawyer’s Lawyer and Law Professor, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 863, 891–92 (1996). 
100 Judicial Selection in the States, CAPITOL FACTS & FIGURES (Council of    
State Gov’ts), June 2010, http://www.csg.org/policy/documents/CR_FF_Judicial 
Selections.pdf. 
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then subject to periodic retention elections.102  Finally, a few 
states follow the federal model where the governor appoints 
judges and the legislature gives its advice and consent.103 
There are measurable differences in the way judges chosen 
under the different systems decide cases.  For example, a Reuters 
study looking at 2,102 death penalty cases over a fifteen-year 
time period found that directly elected state supreme court 
justices reversed death sentences in eleven percent of the cases 
that came before them.104  In contrast, judges subject to selection 
by some variation of the Missouri Plan reversed death sentences 
in fifteen percent of cases,105 and appointed judges reversed death 
sentences twenty-six percent of the time.106 
Judges have an incentive to keep their jobs or to move up to 
higher positions.  Those subject to elections of some sort therefore 
have an incentive to reach politically palatable results so they 
can prevail in campaigns.  This in turn gives them an incentive 
to interpret the law in a way that allows them to reach said 
results.  In many cases, this means appearing tough on crime.  
Judges have several cautionary tales of the fate awaiting them if 
they appear too lenient. 
One of the most high-profile cases is that of Rose Bird, Chief 
Justice of the California Supreme Court.  During her years on 
the court, Chief Justice Bird voted to vacate sixty-one death 
sentences.107  In fact, she never voted to affirm a death sentence 
during her career on the court.108  This was a dangerous tack to 
take on capital punishment cases given that eighty-three percent 
of California voters supported capital punishment in 1985, the 
year before she lost her seat on the court.109  At least partly as a 
result of her votes, groups opposing her raised more than $5.6 
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million to campaign against her.110  On Election Day, she lost her 
seat by a two-to-one margin.111  Though it received less attention 
at the time, two other California Supreme Court justices also lost 
their seats, in part due to their perceived hostility to capital 
punishment.112  Interestingly, the primary financial contributors 
to the campaign were corporations and insurance companies.113  
Unless corporations and insurance companies have a special 
interest in seeing the death penalty carried out, it seems likely 
that they opposed Justice Bird for other reasons and thought 
that raising the issue of capital punishment would give their 
campaigns greater resonance. 
Tennessee Justice Penny White is another example of a 
judge losing her seat for an unpopular decision, as seen in State 
v. Odom, a murder case where the defendant received the death 
penalty.114  On appeal, all five Justices of the Tennessee Supreme 
Court agreed that the trial court committed reversible error in 
refusing to admit psychological testimony as evidence on the 
defendant’s behalf during the sentencing hearing.115  The trial 
court refused to admit the evidence because it was hearsay.116  
The appeal involved the relatively technical question of whether 
a state statute exempting evidence from the normal evidentiary 
rules in capital punishment proceedings meant that the trial 
court should have admitted the hearsay testimony.117  The part of 
the court’s decision that provoked the most popular outrage was 
when it addressed the finding that the crime was “heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel,” an aggravating factor that would support 
imposing the death penalty.118  The court found that defining 
“heinous, atrocious, or cruel” as crimes involving “serious 
physical abuse” did not give sufficient guidance on when to apply 
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the death penalty; instead, the court insisted that “heinous, 
atrocious, or cruel” referred to actions “beyond th[ose] necessary 
to produce death.”119  It further found that the jury’s 
determination that the crime was “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” 
was unwarranted on the record as it stood.120  Six weeks before 
the 1996 election, a prominent newspaper headline declared 
“Court Finds Rape, Murder of Elderly Virgin Not Cruel.”121 
Prominent Tennessee politicians seized on the case and 
opposed Justice White even though she only signed onto the 
opinion and did not actually write it.  Perhaps most humorous 
was Senator Bill Frist’s about-face.  When first asked about her 
after he voted on Election Day, he said he heard that she was the 
“workhorse of the court.”122  Later that day, he called a press 
conference to say he had gone to a library to read her decisions 
and found that “she did not share the views of the average 
Tennessean.”123  According to Justice White, the library Senator 
Frist visited did not carry any copies of the more than 200 
decisions she had written as a judge.124  The Tennessee State 
Republican Party sent an advertisement to voters saying, “If you 
support capital punishment, vote NO on Penny White.”125  She 
lost her seat fifty-five percent to forty-five percent.126  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Gary Wade 
admitted several years later that his campaign conducted polling 
showing that seventy percent of Tennessee voters supported 
capital punishment.127  He acknowledged that “[t]hose who were 
employed to run the campaign believed that it was important for 
this court to have a demonstrated record, or willingness, to 
impose the death penalty.”128 
Other judges have stated outright that politics affects 
judicial decisionmaking.  Judge Charles F. Baird of the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals discussed this in the context of Karla 
Faye Tucker’s case.  Exercising her statutory and state 
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constitutional right, Tucker asked the Texas Board of Pardons 
and Paroles to commute her death sentence to life 
imprisonment.129  But before Tucker submitted the request, some 
members of the board declared publicly that they would reject it; 
Tucker then appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, 
arguing that the board had to accord her petition some level of 
due process, which the court rejected.130  Judge Baird 
dissented.131  After newspapers reported the decision as well as 
Baird’s dissent, Baird’s campaign consultant told him that “[t]his 
is the worst thing you could have done for your political 
campaign.”132  Discussing another case where a judge granted a 
motion to suppress in a capital case, Judge Baird observed, 
“[Y]ou get the message very quickly in Texas that if you rule 
adverse to the prosecution, it’s going to come back and haunt you.  
Perhaps, therefore, it does have an effect on your judicial future 
and subsequent judicial decisions.”133  One candidate for a 
judgeship in Texas went so far as to promise that if elected, she 
would  “never, ever vote to reverse a capital murder case.”134  
Accordingly, judges responding to the need for popular support 
have an incentive to decide legal questions in ways that are 
politically popular. 
Nor is that the only incentive that might affect how judges 
resolve legal questions.  To prevail in elections, judges’ 
campaigns must raise sufficient funds to allow them to compete.  
From 2000 to 2009, state supreme court candidates raised $206.4 
million for their campaigns.135  This more than doubled the $83.3 
million raised from 1990 to 1999.136  Business groups have been 
particularly active.  Overall, they are responsible for forty-four 
percent of funds given to state supreme court candidates.137  In 
2006, they funded ninety percent of “special interest television 
advertisements for judicial candidates.”138  Often, businesses 
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used benign-sounding names such as “Improve Mississippi 
PAC.”139  There is evidence that these contributions affect how 
judges decide cases.  Professors Kang and Shepherd found that 
“business groups’ share of total contributions is positively related 
to elected judges’ voting for business litigants in all case types.”140  
Notably, Professors Kang and Shepherd found that in judges’ 
final term before mandatory retirement, they were no longer 
more likely to favor business litigants.141  This implies that 
judges decide cases differently when they do not have to solicit 
campaign contributions.  While this more immediately relates to 
the civil context, it does have implications for criminal cases.  It 
suggests that judges are incentivized in some cases to make 
decisions that will please those who contribute substantially to 
their campaigns.  If a judge thought a major contributor felt 
strongly about, say, capital punishment, that fact could motivate 
her behavior in a capital punishment case. 
The United States Supreme Court has raised serious 
concerns about how campaign contributions affect judicial 
behavior.  In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the West Virginia 
Supreme Court had reversed a $50 million judgment against 
Massey on claims of fraudulent misrepresentation, concealment, 
and tortious interference with existing contractual relations.142  
After the jury rendered its verdict, but before the West Virginia 
Supreme Court could hear the appeal, an election took place.143  
Massey’s chairman Don Blankenship donated the statutory 
maximum of $1,000 to Brent Benjamin’s campaign to replace one 
of the justices on the court.144  Blankenship donated $2.5 million 
to the political organization And For The Sake Of The Kids, 
contributions that comprised two-thirds of the total amount given 
to the organization.145 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Caperton asked Justice Benjamin to 
recuse himself from the case once he won his seat on the court.146  
Justice Benjamin denied the motion, finding that there was “no 
objective information . . . to show that this Justice has a bias for 
or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the 
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matters which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be 
anything but fair and impartial.”147  The West Virginia Supreme 
Court reversed the $50 million verdict; Justice Benjamin was in 
the majority.148  Caperton moved for a rehearing and asked 
Justice Benjamin to recuse himself, which he refused to do.149  
The court again reversed the verdict on rehearing.150  The United 
States Supreme Court held that due process required Justice 
Benjamin to recuse himself.151  It observed that “Blankenship’s 
campaign efforts had a significant and disproportionate influence 
in placing Justice Benjamin on the case.”152  Even so, the 
Supreme Court allowed that “[n]ot every campaign contribution 
by a litigant or attorney creates a probability of bias that 
requires a judge’s recusal, but this is an exceptional case.”153 
Judges themselves have acknowledged the possibility that 
having to raise money compromises decisions.  Justice Paul E. 
Pfeifer of the Ohio Supreme Court said that he “never felt so 
much like a hooker down by the bus station in any race [he had] 
ever been in as [he] did in a judicial race.”154  Those who 
contributed, in Justice Pfeifer’s view, “mean to be buying a 
vote.”155  Indeed, a study from Ohio found that judges ruled in 
favor of their contributors seventy percent of the time.156  And if 
Ohio’s experience is indicative of how political contributions 
influence judges, it is no answer to say that judges can recuse 
themselves when cases involve their campaign contributors.  
During a twelve-year study involving 215 cases where a 
campaign contributor was a party, judges recused themselves in 
only nine.157  Understandably, forty-six percent of state court 
judges themselves think that judicial contributions influence at 
least some judges’ decisions.158 
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All of this suggests an easy solution: appoint judges.  The 
Reuters study above found that appointed judges were the most 
likely to set aside death sentences.159  Because they do not have 
to face voters or raise campaign contributions, one might suspect 
they have no incentive to decide legal questions in a way that 
generates a popular result.  The best example of an appointive 
model is in the federal court system.  In the federal system, a 
judge can serve for the rest of her life once nominated by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.160  Several states employ 
a variation of this approach.  In Maine, the governor appoints 
judges subject to confirmation by a legislative committee; the 
state senate can then review the appointment.161  In New Jersey, 
the governor appoints judges and then the state senate chooses 
whether to confirm them.162  After a seven-year term, the 
governor can then grant them life tenure.163  Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and Rhode Island join New Jersey in allowing judges 
life tenure.164 
While appointment may reduce some of the incentives 
discussed above, it does not eliminate them.  Recall that one of 
the aspirations a judge likely holds is to be appointed to a seat on 
a higher court.  A trial court judge could harbor ambitions to be 
appointed to an intermediate appellate court.  Similarly, a judge 
sitting on an intermediate appellate court could aspire to serve 
on the court of last resort.  An important way to achieve such 
aspirations is to ensure that an appointment would be politically 
palatable and that one comes to the attention of those who 
appoint judges.  A governor is unlikely to appoint a judge who 
could be easily pilloried for one reason or the other, even if the 
decision for which a nominee would be criticized is the correct 
one.  That is because such an appointment could deprive the 
governor or political party supporting his appointment of political 
capital.  No governor wants a version of what happened with 
Robert Bork to happen to her, where a nomination takes a great 
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deal of time and debate, only to be voted down.165  By the same 
token, a judge wishing for appointment to a higher court must be 
seen favorably by the governor who could appoint her. 
Some evidence shows that these incentives skew decisions 
for appointed judges.  A study found that judges facing 
reappointment by a governor became more likely to support 
executive branch and government litigants than those facing 
unopposed retention elections and even those facing partisan 
reelection campaigns.166  This study has greater implications 
than just judicial behavior in states where governors can 
reappoint judges.  It illustrates a broader point that those who 
want to move to a higher court have an incentive to tailor legal 
rulings to appeal to those who can appoint them.  For example, 
say a state trial court judge wanted to be appointed by the 
governor to the highest court in the state and a seat was opening 
up in the near future.  Further, she is put on a prominent 
criminal case with a legal question that will determine the 
outcome, and she is aware that the governor has been outspoken 
about the crime and the legal issue which the case turns on.  
Suppose too that the public—by and large—is outraged by the 
crime and has its own view about the legal issue.  That judge has 
an incentive to produce a legal ruling in alignment with the 
governor’s views.  If the judge does not, the governor may 
conclude that the judge does not share her legal views or that she 
cannot appoint the judge without inviting popular disapproval. 
There is even the possibility that appointed judges have to 
consider interest group preferences and a governor’s financial 
contributors in determining less salient legal issues.  Suppose the 
judge knows that the governor has been known to place great 
weight on the recommendations of particular interest groups 
about candidates for judgeships who have donated substantial  
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sums of money to her campaigns or given her important public 
support.  That judge would be aware that it is advisable for her 
legal rulings to be in line with that interest group’s views. 
Thus, an appointive model does not eliminate the incentive 
to interpret the law in a results-driven way for judges that desire 
reappointment or an appointment to a higher court.  Sure, a trial 
court judge given life tenure who intends only to serve on the 
trial court would not have an incentive to tailor her legal rulings 
to public opinion or the views of those who could appoint her.  In 
fact, Professor Shepherd’s study indicates that retiring judges 
became no more likely to vote for government litigants in their 
last terms before retiring.167  However, the same logic means that 
a judge elected to a trial court who intends to serve only one term 
there has no incentive to engage in results-driven jurisprudence.  
The determinant for whether the perverse incentives described 
above come into play is whether the judge has ambitions of 
serving multiple terms or serving on a higher court. 
Under present conditions, state judges’ incentives are often 
not aligned with reaching the correct or best result on legal 
questions.  Of course, many if not most judges discharge their 
duties admirably and do their best to apply the law impartially.  
But a justice system should not ignore the incentives it sets up 
for judges to decide cases a certain way.  It must remember that 
for all their education, experience, and—typical—commitment to 
justice, they are human beings like the rest of us. 
2. Attorneys’ Incentives 
The other actors in the judicial system that have experience 
interpreting the law are the attorneys.  Attorneys are officers of 
the court whom many view as having a “special duty to the 
judicial system.”168  Professional rules define some of these 
obligations.  For example, lawyers are not supposed to “make a 
false statement of fact or law” to a court,169 or “fail to disclose to 
the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known 
to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client 
and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”170  Prosecutors even have 
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a special responsibility to safeguard the rights of the accused.171  
But, under those same model rules, lawyers also have a duty to 
zealously advocate for clients.172  And perhaps to a large extent, 
their professional reputations and livelihoods depend upon 
winning. 
For prosecutors, this reality means they have an incentive to 
argue for whatever legal interpretation leads to a conviction so 
that their conviction rates are as high as possible when they run 
for reelection.  Notably, all but four states elect prosecutors.173  
Further, cases that have received considerable media attention 
can often rear their heads in reelection campaigns.174  And 
campaigns are also valuable opportunities for prosecutors to 
show they are tough on crime.175  To give just one example, 
California Attorney General John K. Van de Kamp ran a 
television commercial where an announcer stood before a gas 
chamber and declared that Van de Kamp “put or kept 277 
murderers on Death Row.”176  Conviction rates are discussed in 
about forty percent of prosecutorial elections.177  A prosecutor, 
knowing that conviction rates and high profile cases will affect 
her reelection campaign, has an incentive to argue for whatever 
legal interpretation will allow her to win her cases.  That 
interpretation may or may not be the best one. 
Prosecutors have a further incentive to maximize their 
conviction rates if they plan to use their prosecutorial experience 
as a steppingstone to higher office.  Fifty-one members of the 
114th Congress had prosecutorial experience.178  Political 
operatives have indicated that prosecutors and former 
prosecutors are highly prized recruits to run for office.  A 
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campaign consultant who had worked to elect two U.S. attorneys 
said, “If I were working for either one of the House campaign 
committees, a list of current and former prosecutors in a district 
would be the first thing I’d look at when it was time to start 
recruiting.”179  Of course, it would not be just any prosecutor 
whom political operatives would want; it would be someone who 
could portray herself as a successful prosecutor who has a track 
record of putting criminals away. 
Defense attorneys have an obvious incentive to take a 
results-driven approach to arguing what the correct legal 
interpretation is.  Their job is to help clients avoid prison, or in 
some cases, the death penalty.  Their duty of zealous advocacy 
requires them to argue for whatever legal interpretations will 
help achieve that objective.  A defense lawyer with conviction 
rates that are too high will soon find herself struggling to keep 
and attract clients. 
So, in the present system, the judges and attorneys have 
reputational incentives to promote a results-driven view of the 
law even when that view is incorrect.  Even more worrisome, in 
some cases they have a direct monetary incentive to promote said 
interpretations lest they lose their jobs or the chance to win 
promotions.  There is one party in the judicial system that does 
not have such incentives: the jury.  Jurors will never stand for 
reelection to serve on juries in the future—if the extent to which 
many Americans loathe the idea of jury duty is any indication, 
most of them would just as soon forego the opportunity.  Jurors 
need not worry what financial contributors or politicians will 
think when rendering their decisions.  Jurors neither risk losing 
their jobs nor stifle future ambitions if they make unpopular 
decisions.  As Learned Hand noted, juries ensure that “[t]he 
individual can forfeit his liberty - to say nothing of his life - only 
at the hands of those who, unlike any official, are in no wise 
accountable, directly or indirectly, for what they do, and who at 
once separate and melt anonymously in the community from 
which they came.”180  True, perhaps enraged members of the 
community will find out their names and harass them in 
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particularly high-profile cases.181  But judges and lawyers face 
that risk too.  The difference is that while there could be a 
campaign focusing on the judges and lawyers down the road that 
could deprive them of their livelihoods, no such thing will happen 
to jurors.  The end goal of legal interpretation is to 
dispassionately reason towards the best answer free from any 
motive not to do so.  Jurors’ incentives are currently the best 
aligned with behaving that way. 
3. Juries as a Check 
At the founding, Americans as far apart as Jefferson and 
Hamilton saw the jury’s importance.  The Declaration of 
Independence slammed King George III for “depriving us in 
many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Jury.”182  Hamilton noted 
that “[t]he friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, 
if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set 
upon the trial by jury,” and that “all are satisfied of the utility of 
the institution, and of its friendly aspect to liberty.”183  One of the 
reasons was that juries could check judges and other branches of 
government.184  During debates about the Constitution, many 
expressed concern that judges were “‘always ready to protect the 
officers of government against the weak and helpless citizen.’”185  
They worried that judges were “untrustworthy, . . . exposed to 
bribes, . . . fond of power and authority, and . . . the dependent 
and subservient creatures of the legislature.”186  Giving the jury 
the final word in criminal cases was a way for ordinary citizens 
to protect suspects from such judges.  In Notes on the State of 
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson observed that if a “question relate[s] 
to any point of public liberty, or if it be one of those in which the 
judges may be suspected of bias, the jury undertake to decide 
both law and fact.”187  Since then, scholars have argued that the 
very process of becoming a judge—the need to have connections 
to government officials who could put them on the bench and to 
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retain their goodwill to stay there or advance—will not reliably 
check the government in criminal cases.188  Often, the need for 
juries to check judges and the government is used to justify jury 
nullification.189  However, the need to check the government and 
judges would also justify allowing juries to interpret the law.  
After all, it is only after determining what the law means that a 
jury could consciously choose nullification. 
Moreover, allowing juries to interpret the law can be a useful 
way to protect political minorities.  Imagine a scenario in which a 
political majority passes criminal laws that will 
disproportionately hurt a minority.  Often though, such statutes 
also include some ambiguity.  In those cases, judges have the 
opportunity to legislate interstitially, depending of course on 
whether one thinks that is a judge’s proper role.190  However, 
judges in those states will have to behave in ways the political 
majority favors to maintain their positions or advance to new 
ones.  Thus, they would be unlikely to interpret ambiguities to 
favor politically unpopular defendants.  But juries might.  This is 
because increasing housing segregation on racial191 and political 
lines192 could produce juries in particular areas of a state that 
include many members of the political minority.  In criminal 
cases, the minority will not have enough votes in the legislature 
to stop laws that will disproportionately harm them.  Nor will 
they have the sway to elect judges who will interpret laws to 
ameliorate that impact.  Therefore, the only opportunity political 
minorities may have to interpret the laws that govern them is as 
jurors. 
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B. Ability to Interpret the Law 
Another consideration in deciding whether juries should be 
able to resolve legal questions is whether they are prepared to 
interpret the law given their lack of legal training.  Courts have 
expressed skepticism.  For example, the Illinois Supreme Court 
declared that “[t]he statute which makes the jury the judges of 
the law and the facts has been often severely criticised by the 
profession, and justly so.”193  It admitted that  
[i]nstead of resorting to the Legislature to repeal it, the courts 
have from time to time qualified it, until finally it has been 
rendered absolutely nugatory [because] [n]o honest and 
intelligent jury would, upon reflection, say that by their study 
and experience they were better qualified to judge of the law 
than the court.194 
One argument against giving juries the ability to interpret 
the law is implicit in the considerable literature showing that 
juries currently struggle to understand court instructions.  A 
study of Washington state jurors found that they had trouble 
understanding basic terms in the criminal justice system like 
“reasonable doubt” and “intent.”195  Providing pattern 
instructions to help jurors understand such terms did not prove 
particularly effective.  Jurors given general pattern instructions 
failed to accurately comprehend the terms 34.7% of the time; 
jurors without them failed to accurately comprehend the terms 
35.6% of the time.196  In other words, special attention to the 
instructions in the study did not move the needle much. 
These findings are particularly worrisome in capital 
punishment cases.  In fact, a study of jurors in thirty-one South 
Carolina murder cases found that they frequently misunderstood 
the standard of proof necessary for finding aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.197  And about fifty percent thought 
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that mitigating circumstances had to be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt when they only had to be shown by 
preponderance of the evidence or to the juror’s satisfaction.198  
More than sixty percent of the jurors incorrectly believed that the 
jury had to unanimously agree on mitigating circumstances to 
vote against the death penalty.199 
These are just two studies that reflect a long-held scholarly 
consensus that both real and mock jurors struggle to understand 
jury instructions and apply the law correctly.200  If jurors cannot 
correctly apply the law as explained by the court in many cases, 
does it not stand to reason that they would do even worse at 
interpreting the law by themselves?  No. 
Jury instructions are often drafted by lawyers or committees 
of lawyers who do not adequately account for the fact that the 
jurors applying the instructions are laypeople.201  Instructions 
given to jurors tend to have other problems as well.  The largest 
category of errors in Professors Diamond, Murphy, and Rose’s 
study was one of omission.202  That is, the instructions did not tell 
jurors about a particular issue, assuming perhaps that if they did 
not bring an issue to the jury’s attention, the jury would not 
think about it.203  The jury would then proceed to think about the 
issue in a way that conflicts with existing law.204  A second 
common problem with instructions is structural.205  Instructions 
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have several parts, and juries are given little to no guidance on 
how they relate to each other.206  The result is that jurors in the 
study “frequently spent substantial time struggling with 
connections that they should not have made and trying to 
reconcile what appeared to be inconsistencies that were in fact 
interlocking pieces that actually fit together.”207  All of this 
suggests that the problem may lie more with jury instructions 
themselves and the people writing them than jurors.  If this is 
true, studies demonstrating jurors’ difficulties to apply jury 
instructions do not mean they should not be able to interpret the 
law. 
In fact, allowing juries to interpret the law may allow them 
to understand it better and apply it more faithfully.  In 
Professors Diamond, Murphy, and Rose’s study, jurors in civil 
cases frequently invoked the phrase “reasonable doubt” even 
though the standard of proof in civil cases is preponderance of 
the evidence.208  Phrases like “reasonable doubt” would probably 
have been readily familiar to jurors from legal television shows.  
This suggests that jurors bring preexisting notions about the law 
to the deliberation room.  A terse jury instruction may not be 
enough to move jurors off their old ideas about the law.  But if 
they could listen to the lawyers make legal arguments, see the 
statutes and decisions explaining the relevant standard of proof, 
and ask questions, they would acquire more information to 
override their prior understanding of the law.  So ironically, 
giving jurors the ability to interpret the law could lead to them 
applying it more accurately. 
A second argument is that judges are better able to interpret 
the law than juries because of their educational backgrounds and 
past experiences.  To wit, judges have attended law school209 and 
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have usually accumulated practice experience.210  They are older 
and more educated than the average American.211  This contrasts 
with the state of affairs in the colonies when juries often had the 
right to interpret the law.  In the eighteenth century, many 
judges never received specialized legal training or had practiced 
law.  Between 1760 and 1774, in fact, nine of the eleven judges 
who served on the Massachusetts Superior Court had not even 
practiced law before.212  Six of them had no legal training 
whatsoever.213  Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson could admit, “I 
never presumed to call myself a Lawyer . . . .  The most I could 
pretend to was when I heard the Law laid on both sides to judge 
which was right.”214  Massachusetts was no anomaly.  At one 
point in New Hampshire, two of the three judges on the superior 
court were a clergyman and a doctor.215  From 1814 to 1818, a 
blacksmith served on Rhode Island’s Supreme Court.216 
Even when judges had legal educations or practice 
experience, they did not always have access to a developed body 
of law on which to base their rulings.  Chancellor Kent observed 
of his early service that “[t]here were no reports or state 
precedents . . . .  We had no law of our own and nobody knew 
what [it] was.”217  In eighteenth-century America, it may well 
have been unclear that judges were any better positioned to 
resolve legal questions.218  Colonists and early Americans looking 
at judges would have been well within their rights to conclude 
that they were just as able as judges to interpret the law.219  And 
if Chancellor Kent’s experience is common, that suggests that if 
early Americans had to develop the law themselves—especially 
the common law— it even makes sense that jurors as 
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representatives of the community would have a voice in shaping 
it.  Now, however, there is no problem of too little law.  Criminal 
law has become much more complex than it was at the country’s 
founding.220  It would seem at first glance that judges are more 
capable of grappling with this landscape than lay juries. 
At the outset, the assumption that legal training is required 
to have some say in legal questions is not shared by every 
modern justice system.  Many European systems, for example, 
have embraced a lay judge system where judges without legal 
training sit in criminal cases alongside professionally trained 
judges.221  Lay judges can decide legal as well as factual issues.222  
In addition, we must remember that juries are corporate bodies.  
That means the relevant question is whether a group of twelve 
jurors from different walks of life can cumulatively make legal 
determinations as wise as those of a single judge.  There are at 
least two reasons to think they can. 
First, juries come from more diverse backgrounds than 
judges do.  For example, in state courts, racial minorities—
defined as African Americans, Hispanics, and Asian Americans—
hold only about ten percent of judgeships, despite forming around 
thirty percent of the country’s population.223  There is evidence 
that juries have a greater proportion of women on them 
compared to the proportion of female judges.224  Moreover, juries 
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are more likely to consider the perspectives of Americans from 
different economic positions.  Judges in state appellate courts 
make more than double the amount of money the average 
American does.225  Judges themselves have recognized that their 
privilege could skew their legal interpretations.  In United States 
v. Kras, a litigant sought bankruptcy without paying the required 
fees, arguing that he could not afford to.226  The Supreme Court 
disagreed.227  The required fees, broken into installments, were 
“less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a 
pack or two of cigarettes” and should have been within the 
petitioner’s “able-bodied reach.”228  In dissent, Justice Marshall 
asserted that “[i]t may be easy for some people to think that 
weekly savings of less than $2 are no burden.  But no one who 
has had close contact with poor people can fail to understand how 
close to the margin of survival many of them are.”229  He went on 
to remind the majority that “[t]he desperately poor almost never 
go to see a movie, which the majority seems to believe is an 
almost weekly activity.”230 
Judge Kozinski has argued that this bias affects how courts 
apply the Fourth Amendment in criminal cases.  In United States 
v. Pineda–Moreno, the police came onto a suspect’s driveway to 
place a global positioning system (“GPS”) on his car.231  
Dissenting from the Ninth Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, 
Judge Kozinski argued: 
The very rich will still be able to protect their privacy with the 
aid of electric gates, tall fences, security booths, remote 
cameras, motion sensors and roving patrols, but the vast 
majority of the 60 million people living in the Ninth Circuit will 
see their privacy materially diminished by the panel’s ruling.232 
He lamented that “there’s one kind of diversity that doesn’t exist: 
No truly poor people are appointed as federal judges, or as state 
judges for that matter.  Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or 
sex, are selected from the class of people who don’t live in trailers 
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or urban ghettos.”233  If Justice Marshall and Judge Kozinski are 
correct, the socioeconomic skew of the judiciary influences the 
way it interprets the law.  A jury that includes individuals from 
different economic strata could very well be more likely to ensure 
that interpretations of the law do not favor the wealthy or 
disadvantage the poor. 
Second, juries at the trial level can deliberate.  The ability to 
confer and discuss what they have learned at trial gives jurors 
the opportunity “to combine knowledge, compare and debate 
different understandings of the evidence, and correct one 
another’s errors.”234  This group deliberation “(except in 
extraordinarily one-sided cases) forces people to realize that 
there are different ways of interpreting the same facts.”235  Trial 
court judges do not have this luxury.  Imagine a scenario where a 
juror has an erroneous reading of the law, or one that is 
impractical or unwise.  There are eleven other individuals who 
can explain why that view is incorrect.  There are eleven other 
individuals who can predict what consequences a certain legal 
interpretation would have in future cases.236  The fact that those 
jurors come from so many different walks of life means that they 
are more likely to consider how a particular interpretation would 
affect everyone in society.  Now imagine a trial court judge who 
has an erroneous reading of the law, or one that is impractical or 
unwise.  Sitting alone in chambers, there is no one to discuss her 
interpretation, or explain why it is wrong.237  The fact that she 
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necessarily has one set of life experiences may preclude her from 
seeing the ramifications of her ruling for people from different 
backgrounds.  Allowing juries to interpret the law has the 
potential to recreate the dynamic at courts of appeals, where 
multiple judges can run ideas by each other and forge a 
consensus about the best way to interpret the law. 
These advantages may still not outweigh judges’ legal 
experience and education.  However, we must remember that 
ability to interpret the law is not the sole consideration.  Having 
the right set of incentives in place is critical.  If juries are less 
able to interpret the law correctly than judges, but better 
incentivized to do so, it could still be a rational choice for 
Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia to give juries the final call on 
legal questions. 
C. Practical Concerns 
Courts and commentators have raised practical concerns 
about allowing juries to interpret the law in criminal cases.  The 
fact that allowing juries this power would change the status quo 
presents others.  These are that allowing juries to interpret the 
law will: (1) lead to inconsistent application of the law; 
(2) undermine separation of powers; (3) make it difficult to even 
know how juries have interpreted the law; and (4) be too  
time-consuming. 
1. Inconsistent Application of the Law 
It is commonly accepted that two juries could view the same 
set of facts differently.  Under identical facts, one jury might 
convict a defendant while another might acquit her.  Judges have 
been particularly concerned that allowing juries to interpret the 
law could cause the law to mean different things to different 
jurors.  The result would be that the law itself will be 
unpredictable, which would in turn undermine the rule of law 
itself.238  Even if a state court of last resort conclusively 
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established the meaning of a statute or a state constitutional 
provision in criminal cases, that ruling would always be subject 
to reevaluation and rejection by juries. 
True, juries will not always consistently interpret the law.  
Of course, the same could be said of judges.239  There is sparse 
empirical research on jury legal interpretation, probably in part 
because so few jurisdictions now allow it.  But the research that 
does exist suggests that juries are not as wildly inconsistent as 
we might fear.  A study of Maryland judges’ perceptions about 
jury legal interpretation found that a strong majority of those 
judges did not believe that Article 23 of the Maryland 
Constitution ever changed a trial’s outcome, or they believed it 
only infrequently changed the outcome.240  But let us say for 
argument’s sake that juries would be more likely to generate 
inconsistent interpretations than judges.  That fact alone does 
not mean that juries should not be permitted to interpret the 
law. 
Currently, juries can choose not merely to interpret a statute 
or constitutional provision differently from a judge, but also not 
follow it at all—a practice some courts have sanctioned.241  Jury 
nullification means that juries “refuse[] ‘to apply a law in 
situations where strict application of the law would lead to an 
unjust or inequitable result.’ ”242  This could mean that a jury 
chooses not to convict a defendant when the law requires it do so 
in a particular fact pattern, or even that it chooses to convict 
someone when the law requires it to acquit in a particular 
scenario.  The problem is that if a jury nullifies in a particular 
 
uncertain, from the different views, which different juries might take of it; but in 
case of error, there would be no remedy or redress by the injured party; for the court 
would not have any right to review the law as it had been settled by the jury.”). 
239 The Federal Courts of Appeals, for example, have been known to have splits 
of authority on criminal issues. Compare United States v. Noble, 762 F.3d 509, 513–
14 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress because 
the government waived an argument about lack of Fourth Amendment standing), 
with United States v. Rodriguez–Arreola, 270 F.3d 611, 617 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that “[t]he government cannot waive [the defendant’s] lack of [Fourth Amendment] 
standing”). 
240 Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Right to Disagree: Judges, Juries, and the 
Administration of Criminal Justice in Maryland, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 570, 584–85 
(1977). 
241 E.g., Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920) (“The judge 
cannot direct a verdict it is true, and the jury has the power to bring in a verdict in 
the teeth of both law and facts.”). 
242 Aaron T. Oliver, Jury Nullification: Should the Type of Case Matter?, 6 KAN. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 50 (1996). 
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case, it is hard to know for certain that that is what happened.243  
On the other hand, if juries can interpret the law and provide 
some indication of what they understand it to mean, the system 
would know exactly why it has chosen to acquit or convict.  
Instead of having to wonder whether a jury has nullified, we 
would know definitively whether it did.  That gives us a better 
idea of how consistently the law is currently being applied.  
Moreover, allowing juries to interpret the law could lead to more 
considered decisions about whether to nullify.  Having the 
defense and prosecution present arguments to the jury about how 
they should interpret the law could give them a greater ability to 
know what the law means.  It is only when the jury has a firm 
grasp on the law’s meaning that they can truly choose to 
disregard it.  And when they have more context about what the 
law is trying to accomplish and how it fits into the larger 
criminal justice system gained from hearing such arguments, 
they will better understand the implications of nullifying. 
Of course, it would give many cold comfort to know exactly 
how often the jury incorrectly interprets the law.  But, this could 
be beneficial.  If juries really are misunderstanding the law and 
applying it incorrectly, that raises the question of whether the 
law is as clear as members of the legal profession might think.  
This is a particularly important consideration in criminal cases 
where we expect the law to provide clear notice of what conduct 
is illegal, even to non-lawyers.244  Juries misinterpreting the law 
would send a signal to the legislature and appellate courts that 
their statutes and decisions are unclear as presently formulated.  
These entities would know that they need to reformulate their 
statutes and decisions to provide truly clear notice of what 
conduct is criminalized and how statutes and decisions are 
supposed to apply.  If the law eventually becomes clearer and 
easier to understand because of juror mistakes, that is a small 
price to pay.  So ironically, giving juries the power to 
misinterpret the law could lead to better law. 
 
243 Adrien Leavitt, Queering Jury Nullification: Using Jury Nullification as a 
Tool to Fight Against the Criminalization of Queer and Transgender People, 10 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 709, 723 (2012) (“As a result of Sparf, jurors are forced to 
hide their intention to nullify, making it is [sic] impossible to know precisely when 
jury nullification occurs.”). 
244 United States v. Genova, 333 F.3d 750, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[P]eople are 
entitled to clear notice of what the criminal law forbids.”). 
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Lastly, one has to ask what inconsistent jury legal 
interpretations would tell us about legal interpretation in the 
status quo.  If many juries repeatedly interpret, say, a sentencing 
statute inconsistently, and differently than judges do, that means 
that the court system has imposed uniformity in the absence of 
societal consensus on what that statute means.  And that raises 
serious questions.  How many defendants went to prison or death 
row based on an interpretation of a statute that society does not 
agree on?  And is there not something fundamentally unfair 
about that? 
2. Separation of Powers 
Some courts have suggested that allowing juries to interpret 
the law would usurp the judicial branch’s power to “say what the 
law is.”245  For example, Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts’s 
Supreme Court observed, “It would be alike a usurpation of 
authority and violation of duty, for a court, on a jury trial, to 
decide authoritatively on the questions of fact, and for the jury to 
decide ultimately and authoritatively upon the questions of 
law.”246 
This argument assumes what it must prove: that judges are 
the only proper entity in the legal system to interpret the law.  
There appears to have been no consensus that this was true 
when the founding fathers drafted the federal Constitution 
codifying the principle of separation of powers.  If Justice Chase’s 
impeachment trial—where one of the charges was that he denied 
juries the opportunity to determine questions of law—is any 
indication, the original understanding of separation of powers 
was arguably that juries deciding legal questions did not infringe 
upon it. 
3. How Will We Know How Juries Interpreted the Law? 
Traditionally, juries have given general verdicts.247  They 
either find a defendant guilty or not guilty.  This makes it 
difficult to know exactly why they made the decision they did.  
Did they give particular emphasis to certain facts and not others?  
How did they weigh competing testimony?  With a general 
verdict, it is not always possible to know, even if we can make 
 
245 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
246 Commonwealth v. Porter, 51 Mass. (1 Met.) 263, 276 (1845). 
247 Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and 
Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 769 (1993). 
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inferences about what the jury must have believed in reaching a 
particular result.  One objection to allowing juries to resolve legal 
questions is that we would not know what legal determinations 
they made. 
Leaving aside that this problem is inherent to general 
verdicts and not to legal determinations specifically, there are 
steps the legal system could take to ascertain jurors’ views.  One 
solution would be a greater emphasis on special verdict forms.  
Criminal juries have used special verdicts in many contexts.248  
One way to gain insight into what juries interpreted the law to 
mean would be to use modified special verdict forms with an 
entry for juries to say whether they agreed with the judge’s 
interpretation of the law, and if not, a short explanation of what 
they understood it to mean. 
 
4. Allowing Juries to Interpret the Law Will Lengthen Trials 
There is a worry that having juries answer technical legal 
questions will prolong the trial process, to the detriment of 
judicial economy.249  Jurors, because of their lack of legal 
training, will take longer than a judge would to interpret a 
statute or constitutional provision.  This is probably true.  But it 
is insufficient on its own to prevent juries from interpreting the 
law.  The “delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice 
[resulting from juries], are the price that all free nations must 
pay for their liberty.”250  If juries bring important advantages to 
the interpretative process that other entities in the justice 
system do not, a longer trial seems a fair price to pay for better 
adjudication, especially when life and liberty are at stake. 
 
248 See United States v. Ham, 58 F.3d 78, 85 (4th Cir. 1995) (forfeiture); United 
States v. Delgado, 4 F.3d 780, 792 n.5 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that special verdicts 
are required in the Ninth Circuit only “when a court permits facts which pose a 
genuine possibility of juror confusion to go to the jury” (citing United States v. 
Jerome, 924 F.2d 170, 173, amended, 942 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1991))); United 
States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310, 1317 (7th Cir. 1986) (permitting a special verdict 
so jury could determine amount of marijuana defendants dealt); United States v. 
Kawakita, 96 F. Supp. 824, 830 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (treason). 
249 See Robinson, supra note 2, at 223–25 (“Every lawyer of criminal trial 
experience knows how successfully able counsel for the defendant can confuse a jury, 
and raise so-called ‘reasonable doubts’ on the law, and sometimes ‘hang’ the jury by 
arguing to this untrained tribunal difficult points of law.”). 
250 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *344. 
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5. Effect on Plea Bargaining 
There is a possible advantage I have not yet mentioned: 
changing the calculus around plea bargaining.  Around ninety to 
ninety-five percent of criminal cases end in plea bargains.251  As a 
consequence, “[t]he criminal process in the United States has 
become largely an administrative one, with the police, 
prosecutors, and judges overseeing the criminal laws with little 
intervention by the people.”252  For a defendant, the allure is to 
receive a more lenient sentence, though scholarship has explored 
how plea bargaining has become a coercive process that spurs 
innocent people to plead guilty.253  The temptation to plead guilty 
is particularly strong if courts have definitively interpreted the 
law to mean one thing and the defendant is confident she will be 
convicted under that reading.  But what if defendants could 
argue a contrary view of the law to the jury?  Predicting the 
outcome at trial could become much harder for both sides.  The 
result could be that defendants become willing to take their 
chances at trial.  Enough defendants making that choice could 
diminish legislatures’ enthusiasm for expanding the number of 
crimes and providing draconian punishments.  The Supreme 
Court has recognized that “[i]f every criminal charge were 
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal 
Government would need to multiply by many times the number 
of judges and court facilities.”254  Legislatures would therefore see 
a much higher cost to harsh punishment regimes and have to 
weigh whether they are willing to ask citizens to pay higher 
taxes to sustain those regimes. 
CONCLUSION 
Allowing juries to interpret the law comes with undeniable 
downsides.  One can easily imagine lay jurors struggling to 
understand briefs stuffed full of legal jargon or how relevant 
statutory provisions fit together.  Without previous experience 
interpreting the law, they will take longer than a judge would to 
get up to speed on the issues.  And after all of that, there is a risk 
 
251 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE 
BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/ 
PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf. 
252 Barkow, supra note 184, at 34. 
253 John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated: Factually Innocent 
Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 161–62 (2014). 
254 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
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they will interpret the law incorrectly or more inconsistently 
than judges do.  My purpose here is not to deny these concerns.  
Rather, it is to demonstrate the virtues of such provisions, which 
are more considerable than most members of the legal profession 
evidently believe.  Juries have important advantages over other 
players in the legal system that makes giving them authority to 
interpret the law a rational choice even today. 
The idea of juries interpreting the law in criminal cases has 
rankled the legal profession for a long time.  That feeling 
explains why all but three states stripped juries of such power, 
and why so many would look askance at the state law provisions 
of Indiana, Maryland, and Georgia allowing juries to interpret 
the law.  Far from being antiquated relics, those provisions 
remain a reasonable response to the realities of the justice 
system in the twenty-first century. 
 
